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Abstract In the study of natural language quantification, much recent attention
has been devoted to the investigation of verification procedures associated with the
proportional quantifier most. The aim of these studies is to go beyond the traditional
characterization of the semantics of most, which is confined to explicating its truth-
functional and presuppositional content as well as its combinatorial properties, as
these aspects underdetermine the correct analysis of most. The present paper con-
tributes to this effort by presenting new experimental evidence in support of a
decompositional analysis of most according to which it is a superlative construction
built from a gradable predicate many or much and the superlative operator -est
(Hackl, in Nat Lang Semant 17:63–98, 2009). Our evidence comes in the form of
verification profiles for sentences like Most of the dots are blue which, we argue,
reflect the existence of a superlative reading of most. This notably contrasts with
Lidz et al.’s (Nat Lang Semant 19:227–256, 2011) results. To reconcile the two sets
of data, we argue, it is necessary to take important differences in task demands into
account, which impose limits on the conclusions that can be drawn from these
studies.
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1 Introduction: most in subject position
It is well known that most in object position has both proportional uses, in which
case it appears in its bare form and can be reasonably well paraphrased by more than
half, as in (1a), and superlative uses similar to the reading that is obtained when
most combines with certain kinds of degree predicates (e.g., most expensive car). In
the latter cases, most is accompanied by the definite article, as in (1b) (Bresnan
1973).1
(1) a. John talked to most of the students. proportional
≈ John talked to more than half of the students
b. John talked to the most students. superlative
≈ John talked to more students than anybody else
There have been several attempts in the literature to relate the two uses of most
(e.g., Pinkham 1985; Yabushita 1999; Hackl 2009; Krasikova 2011; Szabolsci
2012). The canonical view among them is that this is a case of lexical ambiguity,
with bare most a quantificational determiner (Barwise and Cooper 1981) and the
most a superlative construction (e.g. Szabolcsi 1986).2
When most occurs in subject position, only bare most is grammatical. The most is
degraded and even ungrammatical for many speakers, as illustrated by (2).3
(2) a. Most of the students talked to John.
b. ??The most students talked to John.
The range of possible interpretations available to bare most in subject position as
well as the associated verification strategies have become a central topic of debate in
recent years (e.g. Hackl 2009; Pietroski et al. 2009, 2011; Lidz et al. 2011; Solt
2011; Kotek et al. 2011a, 2011b). More specifically, while it is uncontroversial that
bare most in subject position can give rise to proportional truth conditions similar to
the ones expressed by more than half, it has been argued in Hackl (2009) that the
verification strategy associated with it is quite different from the one associated with
1 Bare most can also occur outside of the partitive frame, as in (i) below, and in that case the sentence
tends to have a generic interpretation. See Matthewson (2001) and Szabolsci (2012) for a discussion of
such cases.
(i) Most linguists are millionaires. (Matthewson 2001, ex. 47)
2 See Szabolcsi (2010) for a review of the history of this debate.
3 The extent to which the most in subject position is degraded is subject to grammatical factors as well as
dialectal variation. For instance, data like (i) from Kotek et al. (2011b), are acceptable to most native
speakers of English.
(i) Where do the most students live?
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more than half and reflects its superlative morphosyntax. Moreover, Kotek et al.
(2011a) have argued that bare most in subject position is in fact ambiguous between
a (preferred) proportional reading and a (latent) superlative reading. This contrasts
markedly with the theoretical framework of Lidz et al. (2011), who conduct a
sentence verification study of bare most to adjudicate between different ways of
describing the truth-conditional import of this form. Lidz et al. assume that bare
most is unambiguously proportional and, indeed, their results provide no indication
that bare most might share any properties with the most—which, we should note,
they do not explicitly discuss. Consequently, Lidz et al. propose an analysis of bare
most that makes the prediction that bare most in subject position, like elsewhere,
only gives rise to proportional truth conditions.
The present paper, by contrast, presents novel experimental evidence which
supports an analysis of most according to which the most and bare most are built
from the same basic ingredients—a gradable predicate many/much and the
superlative operator -est—but project different LFs, as argued for e.g. in Hackl
(2009). It also argues that the seemingly conflicting set of empirical results from
previous studies can be reconciled with this structural view of most once the
differences in experimental techniques employed by the various researchers are
properly factored in. The paper is composed as follows: In Sect. 2 we briefly review
the debate between an approach that views most as a lexical primitive and one
which views most as a complex superlative construction. In Sect. 3 we present novel
data from two experiments that support the view that most is uniformly a superlative
construction. Section 4 discusses the implications of our results for the theory of
most, differences between the determiners most and more than half that arise from
the experiments, and also previous work on most—notably the work of Lidz et al.
(2011), who conducted a very similar experiment but reported very different
findings about the nature of most than we do here. We address several concerns
regarding the experiment in Lidz et al. (2011) and the conclusions that were drawn
based on this work.
2 Background: two theories of most
As we saw in (1a,b), most in object position has proportional and superlative uses.
The availability of these two readings seems to correlate with the presence or
absence of the definite article: bare most gives rise to a proportional reading, while
the most produces a superlative reading.
The canonical take on these facts, implicit e.g. in Barwise and Cooper (1981), is
to assume that the observed pattern is akin to a lexical ambiguity. That is, there are
two unrelated mosts: bare most is a lexical determiner while the most is a superlative
construction built from a gradable predicate such as many or much and the
superlative morpheme -est. A recent version of this view on bare most, proposed in
Lidz et al. (2011), is expressed in (3). On this analysis, bare most is analyzed as a
quantificational determiner that takes two set-denoting expressions A and B and
yields True only if the number of As that are Bs is greater than the number of As
minus the number of As that are Bs. This holds just in case there are more As that
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are Bs than there are As that are not Bs or, equivalently, more than half of the As are
Bs.4
(3) a. John talked to most of the students.
b. ⟦most⟧(A)(B) = 1 iff |A \ Β|[|Α| − |Α \ Β|
c. ⟦John talked to most of the students⟧ = 1 iff |{x: x is a student} \ {x: John
talked to x}|[|{x: x is a student}| − |{x: x is a student} \ {x: John talked
to x}|
The superlative reading of the most, by contrast, is canonically analyzed as a
construction that involves degree quantification, with the superlative morpheme -est
denoting a degree quantifier that is restricted by a comparison class C, which, in the
case of (4a), contains contextually salient alternatives to John. (4a) is true only if
there is a plurality of students that John talked to that is more numerous than any
plurality of students talked to by any contextually salient individual different from
John (Heim 1985; Szabolcsi 1986).5
(4) a. John talked to the most students.
b. ⟦John talked to the most students⟧ = 1 iff ∃d∃X[students(X) & John
talked to X & |X|  d & ∀y 2 C[y ≠ John→ ¬∃Y[students(Y) & y talked
to Y & |Y|  d]]]
On the structural view, both the proportional and the superlative readings of most
are analyzed as superlative constructions. The proposal in Hackl (2009) analyzes the
superlative reading of most essentially as in (4) above. The proportional reading, on
the other hand, is analyzed as in (5).6
(5) a. John talked to most of the students.
b. ⟦John talked to most of the students⟧ = 1 iff ∃d∃X[students(X) & John
talked to X & |X|  d & ∀Y 2 C [students(Y) & Y ? X] → |Y| \ d]]
(5b) is parallel to (4b) except that (i) the comparison class C is assumed to be the set
of student pluralities rather than the set of contextually relevant people who talked
to students and (ii) non-identity is assumed to hold between any two alternatives in
C if they are non-overlapping pluralities of students. The symbol ? is used to
4 Traditionally, the semantics of most is described as in (i) below, which is truth-conditionally equivalent
to (3b). We discuss this notation and the difference between most and more than half in more detail in
Sect. 4.
(i) ⟦most⟧(A)(B) = 1 iff |A \ Β| [ |Α − Β|
5 To avoid potentially distracting clutter, we will ignore the difference between sets and pluralities
whenever the distinction is immaterial to the discussion. For instance, the symbol for the ‘cardinality of’
function, | . |, is used for both sets and pluralities.
6 Throughout this paper, we abstract away from the logical forms corresponding to proportional and
superlative truth conditions—see Hackl (2009) as well as Krasikova (2011), Kotek et al. (2011a, b),
Szabolcsi (2012), and Pancheva (to appear), among others, for details and discussion—and simply use
descriptions of truth conditions such as those in (4b) and (5b) as shorthand.
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represent the no-overlap relation, which replaces the non-identity relation ≠ of (4b).
(5a) is true just in case there is a plurality of students, X, that John talked to that is
more numerous than all student pluralities that have no overlap with X. This
amounts to demanding that there be a plurality of students that John talked to that is
more numerous than the student plurality that John did not talk to. Thus, (5a)
expresses proportional truth conditions even though it is analyzed as a superlative
construction. It is true just in case John talked to more than half of the students.7
The lexical view of most and the structural view of most make diverging
predictions with regard to the ability of bare most to take on a superlative reading.
Consider a case where bare most occurs in subject position, as in (6a). The semantic
analyses assumed for such a sentence by the lexical view and the structural view are
given in (6b,c), respectively.
(6) a. Most of the dots are blue.
b. ⟦Most of the dots are blue⟧ = 1 iff |Dots \ Blue|[|Dots| − |Dots \ Blue |
c. ⟦Most of the dots are blue⟧ = 1 iff ∃d∃X[Dots(X) & Blue(X) & |X|  d &
∀Y 2 C [[Dots(Y) & Y ? X]→ |Y|\ d]]
Under the lexical view of most, (6a) should only have proportional truth
conditions, as given in (7a). Under the structural ambiguity approach to most,
however, which truth conditions are expressed depends on the content of the
comparison class, C. If C is identified with the extension of the plural NP dots, i.e.
closed under individual sum formation (Link 1983), proportional truth conditions
result. This is because all dot pluralities different from the blue dots—whether they
are homogenous in color or not—need to be less numerous than the blue dots for the
sentence to be true. However, if C is not closed under individual sum formation but
further constrained, e.g. so that only homogenously colored dot pluralities are
included (as proposed in Kotek et al. 2011a), (6c) only requires that the blue dots
outnumber each of the non-blue dot pluralities separately, rather than having to
outnumber the non-blue dots as a whole. Under such a construal of C, then, (6a)
expresses superlative truth conditions, given in (7b).8
(7) a. Proportional truth conditions:
|blue dots|[|non-blue dots|
b. Superlative truth conditions:
For each non-blue color Z, |blue dots|[|Z dots|
To see more concretely how (7a,b) diverge, consider the dot arrays in Figs. 1 and 2.
According to the proportional truth conditions, (7a), Most of the dots are blue is true
7 To ensure that (5b) does not express “absolute” truth conditions, which would be paraphrasable by all
the students, it needs to be assumed that C contains at least two distinct student pluralities. Hackl (2009)
argues that this is due to a presupposition of the superlative operator.
8 Here and throughout, we use ‘blue dots’ to refer to the target set that is mentioned in the most statement
and ‘yellow dots’ and ‘red dots’ to refer to members of the complement set (the non-blue set). We use the
term ‘most statement’ to refer to a sentence that has most in subject position, e.g.Most of the dots are blue,
and ‘more than half statement’ to refer to a sentence like More than half of the dots are blue.
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just in case more than half of the dots in the array are blue. An example of such an
array is given in Fig. 1, where the 9 blue dots comprise more than half of all the dots
and consequently outnumber the non-blue dots. Note that both the lexical view of
most and the structural view of most make the same prediction about the verification
ofmostwith regard to Fig. 1: speakers should judge the sentence as true in this figure.
The two theories make diverging predictions about the verification of most
statements with regard to dot arrays as in Fig. 2. This array contains 7 blue dots, 4 red
dots and 4 yellow dots. Hence, there are more non-blue dots than blue dots. The
lexical view of most assigns only proportional truth conditions to the statement Most
of the dots are blue and therefore predicts that it should be judged false. Under the
structural view of most, on the other hand,Most of the dots are blue has a superlative
reading in addition to the proportional reading, and that reading is true in Fig. 2. In
particular, under the superlative reading of most the number of blue dots is compared
to the number of red dots and to the number of yellow dots separately. Since in both
comparisons the blue set comes out as more numerous than the competitor, the
sentence is true. Therefore, while the lexical view of most predicts that speakers will
verify themost statement as false, the structural view ofmost allows speakers to verify
the most statement as either true or false with regard to Fig. 2.
In the remainder of this paper we will refer to pictures as in Fig. 2, for whichMost
of the dots are blue is true only under the superlative reading of most, as ‘superlative’
pictures or pictures in the ‘superlative’ condition. We will use the term ‘superlative
verification strategy’ to refer to the idea that speakers verify a sentence according to
superlative truth conditions, and the term ‘proportional verification strategy’ to refer
to the idea that they verify a sentence according to proportional truth conditions.
Two previous studies, Lidz et al. (2011) and Kotek et al. (2011a), have
experimentally examined the behavior of most in subject position in sentences such
as Most of the dots are blue, where the sentence is verified against a picture
Fig. 1 Most of the dots are blue is true under both readings. (Color figure online)
Fig. 2 Most of the dots are blue is only true under the superlative reading. (Color figure online)
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containing blue dots and dots in other colors, in various configurations. Despite
many similarities between their studies, they obtained very different results: Kotek
et al. (2011a) find that most is ambiguous between a dominant proportional reading
and a latent superlative reading. The results of Lidz et al.’s (2011) study, on the
other hand, are at least consistent with most only having a proportional reading.9
Below, we will present results of a new study that supports the conclusion that bare
most in subject position does have a superlative reading. This finding provides
evidence against the lexical view under which most and the most are unrelated
lexical items. It lends further support to theories such as the one proposed in Hackl
(2009), under which most and the most are both superlative constructions consisting
of a silent degree predicate MANY and the superlative morpheme -est.10 In Sect. 4.3
we address the source for the divergence of results between Lidz et al. (2011), on
the one hand, and Kotek et al. (2011a) and the current study, on the other.
3 Current experiments
As mentioned above, two previous studies of most, Lidz et al. (2011) and Kotek
et al. (2011a), used similar methodologies to study the behavior of bare most in
subject position. Both studies tested the verification of most statements with respect
to dot arrays whose properties were manipulated in various ways. The experiments
reported in this section aim to combine the manipulations of the two previous
studies to provide conclusive evidence as to the nature of bare most.
In particular, we used a COLOR manipulation of the kind also used in both
previous studies, which allowed us to create dot arrays in the ‘superlative’
condition. We combined this with a WEBER RATIOS manipulation as used in Lidz
et al. (2011) but not in Kotek et al. (2011a): under this manipulation, the relative
sizes of the blue set and the non-blue set are varied. Verification of most statements
has been shown by Lidz et al. (2011) to be sensitive to Weber’s law, stating that the
discriminability of two quantities is a function of their ratio (see Pica et al. 2004; see
also Heim et al. 2012, and Tomaszewicz 2011 for relevant work on Polish).
Specifically, Lidz et al. (2011) showed that the accuracy of the verification of most
statements increases gradually as the ratio of blue to non-blue dots in an array
increases. Lastly, we added a DETERMINER manipulation used in Kotek et al. (2011a)
but not in Lidz et al. (2011): we compared the verification of most to that of more
9 Again, we note that Lidz et al. (2011) do not directly test the existence or absence of the superlative
reading, since it is assumed not to exist. Rather, Lidz et al. are concerned with the enumeration of
homogeneously colored subsets of the non-blue set—which we will show below is necessary for the
calculation of superlative truth conditions—for other reasons. However, leaving the authors’ motivations
aside, the fact is that the experimental manipulations in Lidz et al.’s study were such that they could have
brought out the presence of the superlative reading; yet their results are consistent with no such reading
being used by the participants in their experiment.
10 An anonymous reviewer provides additional evidence in support of the existence of a superlative
reading of most in subject position, in the form of naturally occurring data such as the following:
(i) Most respondents (34 %) live in the South, followed by 24 % in the Midwest, 23 % in the West,
and 17 % in the Northeast.
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than half, which is unambiguously proportional. The canonical analysis of more
than half is given in (8). Under the lexical approach to most, given in (6b), more
than half is truth-conditionally equivalent to bare most: both unambiguously have
only proportional truth conditions and are true and false in exactly the same
circumstances. Under the structural ambiguity approach to most, given in (6c), on
the other hand, most has a reading which more than half lacks—the superlative
reading—and hence the two determiners are predicted to behave differently under
the ‘superlative’ condition: more than half will be unambiguously false, but most
will have a true reading.
(8) ⟦more than half⟧(A)(B) = 1 iff |A \ B|[½ |A|
Finally, the experiments presented here follow Kotek et al. (2011a) in imposing
no constraints on how long participants can see the dot array in a trial or how much
time they take to make their True/False decision. This diverges from the
methodology of Lidz et al. (2011), who only present the dot arrays to their subjects
for 150 ms. In Sect. 4.3 we discuss the implications of this choice, which we believe
are crucial for understanding the differences between the results obtained by the two
previous studies of most.
3.1 Experiment 1: ratio manipulation
This experiment provided baseline data on the use of an experimental design that
combines the WEBER RATIOS manipulation of Lidz et al. (2011) with the DETERMINER
manipulation of Kotek et al. (2011a). In particular, we were interested in (a)
establishing the behavior of more than half with regard to dot arrays of varying
Weber ratios, and (b) understanding how participants verify most and more than half
when the time allotted to the task is not restricted.
3.1.1 Methods and materials
In each trial in Experiment 1, participants were shown a picture containing 20–21
dots and a sentence describing that picture. Participants were asked to judge whether
what the sentence said was ‘True’ or ‘False’ of the picture. Target trials were paired
with one of the two statements in (9)–(10), where, as in the Lidz et al. (2011) study,
the test sentence was always about the blue dots. DETERMINER was a between-subject
factor: participants saw only most statements or only more than half statements, and
those statements were paired with the exact same pictures across conditions.
(9) Most of the dots are blue
(10) More than half of the dots are blue
All the pictures in Experiment 1 contained blue and yellow dots. Table 1 indicates
the number of blue and yellow dots and the blue:yellow ratio for the 9 target trials in
Experiment 1.Weber ratios  1, where the truth conditions ofmost andmore than half
predict that the statements in (9)–(10) are false (‘False-ratios’), are shaded in gray.
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Weber ratios[1,where the truth conditions ofmost andmore than half predict that the
statements in (9)–(10) are true (‘True-ratios’), are not shaded.
The 9 target figures used in the experiment are shown in Fig. 3. In addition to the
9 target trials, Experiment 1 contained 24 filler trials. Of these filler items, 8
contained the determiner more than n for different numbers n, 8 contained the
determiner many, and 8 contained the determiner more than n % or more than n/m
for different ns and ms. In half of the filler trials, the correct answer was True and in
the other half it was False.11 The items were presented in one of two pseudo-
randomized orders where each pair of target items was separated by at least one
filler item, and the first item was not a target item.
The survey, randomization process, and the HTML templates used for this
experiment were created using the turktools software (Erlewine and Kotek, to
appear). The survey was posted on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants were
paid $0.20 for their participation. They were asked to indicate their native language,
but payment was not contingent on their response.
3.1.2 Results
In all, 195 native speakers of English participated in this study.12 Of these, 97 subjects
participated in the ‘most’ condition and 98 participated in the ‘more than half’
Table 1 Blue:yellow dots and ratios in Experiment 1
8:12
[0.67]
9:12
[0.75]
9:11
[0.82]
10:11
[0.91]
10:10
[1]
11:10
[1.1]
11:9
[1.22]
12:9
[1.33]
12:8
[1.5]
FALSE
8:12
[0.67]
9:12
[0.75]
9:11
[0.82]
10:11
[0.91]
10:10
[1]
TRUE
11:10
[1.1] 
11:9
[1.22] 
12:9
[1.33] 
12:8
[1.5] 
Fig. 3 Dot arrays of target items in Experiment 1. (Color figure online)
11 The pictures associated with many and with the proportional determiners were generated so as to
clearly match the expressed truth conditions in the True condition and to clearly not match them in the
False condition. That this manipulation was successful was verified by a post-hoc inspection of accuracy
of the filler items, detailed in Sect. 3.2.2 below.
12 Here and in Experiment 2 results are reported for all native speakers of English, including those who
speak a second language. The results do not change if only monolingual speakers are included in the
analysis.
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condition. Four non-native speakers and one subject who did not report on their native
language were excluded from the analysis. No subjects were excluded from the
analysis because of low accuracy rates (\75 % on filler trials). Two filler items were
excluded from the analysis because of low accuracy rates (\75% accuracy across all
participants). The remaining 22 filler items had amean accuracy of 97.3%.Our results
would not change if a threshold of 80 % had been chosen instead.
Figure 4 shows the average percentage of True responses to Most of the dots are
blue and More than half of the dots are blue for the 9 ratios of Experiment 1
(N = 195). We observe an inflection point: for False-ratios, the percentage of True
responses is near zero. For True-ratios, the percentage of True responses is at 77 %
and 85 % for most and more than half respectively for the ratio 1.1, and at 90 % and
nearly 100 % for most and more than half respectively for all ratios above 1.1.
Importantly, we also observe an asymmetry between the behavior of most and
more than half: although the verification behavior of most is almost identical to that
of more than half for all False-ratios, the two determiners come apart for True-
ratios. We observe a parallel proportion of True judgments for most and more than
half, with most consistently verified as true 5–7 % less often than more than half.
A mixed-effects logit model was fit to the data.13 The model examines the effect
of the WEBER RATIOS (with 9 levels as specified in Table 1) and DETERMINER (most vs.
more than half) on percent-True in Experiment 1. The random effect structure
includes random intercepts for both subjects and items, and by-subject random
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
0.67 0.75 0.82 0.91 1 1.1 1.22 1.33 1.5 
A
ve
ra
ge
 %
 T
ru
e 
Blue/Yellow ratio 
Most 
More than half 
Fig. 4 Average percentage of True responses in Experiment 1 (accuracy ≥75 %). (Color figure online)
13 The models reported in the paper were fit using R and the R package lme4 (Bates and Maechler 2009).
The DETERMINER predictor was contrast coded as follows:
(i) DETERMINER: most = 0.5 more than half = −0.5
Random effect structures in our models are the maximal ones supported by the data and by log-likelihood
tests comparing models with the effects to models from which they were removed (cf. Baayen et al. 2008;
Barr et al. 2013).
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slopes for the effects of WEBER RATIOS.14 The fixed effects are summarized in
Table 2. The correlations among the fixed effects are all within ±0.3, with the
exception of a strong correlation between the main effect of DETERMINER and its
interaction with WEBER RATIOS.15
We find a main effect of WEBER RATIOS and an interaction between WEBER RATIOS
and DETERMINER. Because of the strong co-linearity between the main effect of
DETERMINER and the interaction of DETERMINER and WEBER RATIOS, we do not put any
weight on the near-significant main effect of DETERMINER found in this model.
3.1.3 Discussion
Experiment 1 yielded two important findings. First, the verification of most and
more than half is indeed sensitive to the Weber ratio, such that for arrays with ratios
below 1, the test sentences are judged false and for arrays above 1 they are judged
true. This is, of course, just a reflection of the truth-conditional import of these
determiners. Second, we find that although most and more than half are truth-
conditionally equivalent in all target items of Experiment 1, the verification of the
two determiners is notably different: most patterns with more than half for
verification of items with ratios below and equal to 1: for these, the test sentences
are judged to be true less than 10 % of the time; for ratios above 1, on the other
hand, most and more than half exhibit parallel behavior, but the test sentence with
most is judged to be true on average 5–7 % less often than that with more than half
in all 4 True items. We return to this point in the discussion in Sect. 4.1. To
conclude, although the task demands are different in Experiment 1 compared to the
task in Lidz et al. (2011), we find a similar effect of the WEBER RATIOS on the
Table 2 Summary of the fixed effects
Predictor Coefficient Standard error p
Intercept −20.599 1.600 \0.001
DETERMINER 4.923 2.597 0.0580
WEBER RATIOS 19.216 1.516 \0.001
DETERMINER 9 WEBER RATIOS −4.968 2.487 \0.05
Bold values are statistically significant
14 A more detailed model that includes slopes for the random effect of DETERMINER does not significantly
improve the model fit compared to the model that does not include these slopes (χ2(3) = 4.7976,
p = 0.1872).
15 A model that predicts percent-True in Experiment 1 from DETERMINER and TRUTH CONDITIONS
(predicting False for all Weber ratios,  1 and True for all Weber ratios[1 for both most and more than
half) yields main effects of these two predictors and no interaction. A model that predicts percent-True in
Experiment 1 from DETERMINER, WEBER RATIOS, and TRUTH CONDITIONS did not converge because of strong
co-linearity between the latter two predictors. The model that uses WEBER RATIOS as a predictor is more
informative than the model that uses TRUTH CONDITIONS, given the design of Experiment 1. This model
allows for pair-wise comparisons of the behavior of participants at different ratios, as opposed to
collapsing all different points and testing one cloud of noisier data. We therefore concentrate on this
model, rather than on the one that uses TRUTH CONDITIONS in place of WEBER RATIOS.
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verification of most. Experiment 2 builds on this finding by adding a COLOR
manipulation to the WEBER RATIOS manipulation.
3.2 Experiment 2: ratio-by-color manipulation
Experiment 2 expands on the results of Experiment 1 and explores the simultaneous
effect of WEBER RATIOS and COLOR on the verification of statements containing most
and more than half. Pictures in this experiment have either two (blue and yellow) or
three (blue, yellow, and red) colors. The presence of a third color in the picture is
predicted to have an effect only on those determiners that can be evaluated using
subsets of the non-blue set separately. Consequently, more than half is expected not
to be sensitive to the COLOR manipulation. Under the lexical view of most, most too
is predicted not to be sensitive to the COLOR manipulation, because it only has a
proportional reading. Under the structural view, however, most is predicted to be
sensitive to the COLOR manipulation, because it has a superlative reading under
which the blue set is compared to the yellow set and to the red set separately.
Moreover, a ‘superlative’ verification strategy of most is expected to be sensitive not
only to the presence of multiple subsets of non-blue dots, but also to their structure:
following Weber’s law, a most statement is predicted to be more difficult to verify
against a picture with a blue:yellow:red ratio of 10:10:1, compared to a picture with
a ratio of 10:6:5, even though the overall blue:non-blue ratio is the same in both
cases. To investigate this prediction, Experiment 2 tests not only the effect of COLOR
but also the effect of different WEBER RATIOS within the non-blue set on the
verification of most and more than half.
3.2.1 Methods and materials
Experiment 2 combines the DETERMINER and WEBER RATIOS manipulations of
Experiment 1 with an additional COLOR manipulation: dot arrays in Experiment 2
had either two colors or three colors. We used three different ways of constructing
3-color arrays by varying the ratios of blue:yellow and blue:red dots. In what
follows, we will refer to these ratios as COLOR RATIOS. Pictures in the 2-COLOR
condition contained blue and yellow dots, and pictures in the 3-COLOR condition
contained blue, yellow, and red dots. In the BALANCED condition, the yellow and red
dots were split up evenly. In the MILDLY BALANCED condition, the dots were split up
somewhat evenly, but with more yellow than red dots. In the UNBALANCED condition,
pictures contained one red dot and all the other non-blue dots were yellow. Pictures
used 9 different WEBER RATIOS: four below 1; one at exactly 1; and four above 1; all
were identical to those used in Experiment 1. These WEBER RATIOS were held
constant across the 2-COLOR condition and the three 3-COLOR conditions. The overall
number of dots in the pictures was again 20–21.
The design of Experiment 2 is summarized in Table 3. Each row corresponds to
one COLOR level (2C, 3C UNBALANCED, 3C MILDLY BALANCED, 3C BALANCED). Each
column represents one WEBER RATIO, indicated at the top of the column. The COLOR
RATIO is manipulated in the different COLOR conditions, with a total of 26 different
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COLOR RATIOS distributed across the COLOR conditions. Each cell in Table 3 provides
information about the numbers of blue, yellow, and red dots in that cell, and the
COLOR RATIO of blue:yellow dots in the cell (in brackets). Note that for cells in the
2C condition, the COLOR RATIO is the same as the WEBER RATIO, since there is only
one non-blue color in those trials.
In Table 3 there are four columns on the right withWeber ratios above 1, for which
most statements are true under proportional (and hence also superlative) truth
conditions. In cells in the first five columns on the left, most and more than half
statements are false under proportional truth conditions. These cells are divided into
two groups, as indicated by their shading: the gray shaded cells represent pictures for
whichmost is also false under superlative truth conditions. The white cells in the table
represent ‘superlative’ pictures, which are false under proportional truth conditions
but true under superlative truth conditions. These pictures contain dot arrays with a
Weber ratio below 1 (as can be seen in the corresponding 2C cell in the same column),
but a Color ratio above 1, as the numbers in brackets in those cells show.
The 36 target pictures used in Experiment 2 are given in Fig. 5. Below each
picture we indicate the numbers of blue:yellow:red dots in the picture and the blue:
yellow Color ratio (in brackets) for that picture. For the 2C items, the same pictures
were used as in Experiment 1.
We can make the following prediction: if most has a superlative reading—that is,
if most can be verified using the Color ratios (blue:yellow and blue:red) instead of
the Weber ratio (blue:non-blue), we expect speakers to judge most statements for
‘superlative’ pictures as true more often than for other pictures in the same column
(i.e., pictures that have the same Weber ratio but are false under the superlative
reading). Furthermore, this behavior should track Weber’s law similarly to the
behavior we observed for WEBER RATIOS in Experiment 1: higher COLOR RATIOS
should be easier to verify than ratios that are closer to 1. On the other hand, if most
only has a proportional reading, which is truth-conditionally equivalent to that of
more than half, it should not be affected by COLOR RATIOS. In that case, we predict all
cells in a given column in Table 3 to be similarly rated for most, and the same is
Table 3 Blue:yellow:red dots, and COLOR RATIOS (in brackets) in Experiment 2
TC
COLOR
Proportional most : False
8:12 9:12 9:11 10:11 10:10
Proportional most : True
11:10 11:9 12:9          12:8
2C 8:12
[0.67]
9:12
[0.75]
9:11
[0.82]
10:11
[0.91]
10:10
[1]
11:10
[1.1]
11:9
[1.22]
12:9
[1.33]
12:8
[1.5]
3C
UNBALANCED
8:11:1
[0.73]
9:11:1
[0.86]
9:10:1
[0.9]
10:10:1
[1]
10:9:1
[1.11]
11:9:1
[1.22]
11:8:1
[1.38]
12:8:1
[1.5]
12:7:1
[1.71]
3C  MILDLY 
BALANCED
8:9:3
[0.89]
9:9:3
[1]
9:8:3
[1.13]
10:8:3
[1.25]
10:7:3
[1.42]
11:7:3
[1.57]
11:6:3
[1.83]
12:7:2
[1.71]
12:6:2
[2]
3C
BALANCED
8:6:6
[1.33]
9:6:6
[1.5]
9:6:5
[1.5]
10:6:5
[1.67]
10:6:4
[1.67]
11:5:5
[2.2]
11:5:4
[2.2]
12:5:4
[2.4]
12:4:4
[3]
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expected for more than half as well. The predictions for the trials that are false under
the proportional reading are summarized in (11) below.16
(11) Predictions for Experiment 2 (5 columns on the left, where proportional
most is false):
a. More than half: No effect of COLOR.
All trials in columns 1–5 are judged False.
b. Most—lexical view: No effect of COLOR.
All trials in columns 1–5 are judged False.
c. Most—structural view: Effect of COLOR.
2C: All trials in columns 1–5 are judged False.
3C UNBALANCED: Trials in columns 1–4 are False; the trial in column 5 is True.
3C MILDLY BALANCED: Trials in columns 1–2 are False; trials in columns
3–5 are True.
3C BALANCED: All trials in columns 1–5 are True.
To test these predictions, target trials in Experiment 2 were paired with one of the
two statements in (12)–(13) about the blue dots. As in Experiment 1, DETERMINER
was a between-subject factor: participants evaluated the pictures shown in Fig. 5
either against most statements or against more than half statements (but no
participant was given both most and more than half statements).
(12) Most of the dots are blue
(13) More than half of the dots are blue
8:12
[0.67]
9:12
[0.75]
9:11
[0.82]
10:11
[0.91]
10:10
[1]
11:10
[1.1]
11:9
[1.22]
12:9
[1.33]
12:8
[1.5]
8:11:1
[0.73]
9:11:1
[0.86]
9:10:1
[0.9]
10:10:1
[1]
10:9:1
[1.11]
11:9:1
[1.22]
11:8:1
[1.38]
12:8:1
[1.5]
12:7:1
[1.71]
8:9:3
[0.89]
9:9:3
[1]
9:8:3
[1.13]
10:8:3
[1.25]
10:7:3
[1.42]
11:7:3
[1.57]
11:6:3
[1.83]
12:7:2
[1.71]
12:6:2
[2]
8:6:6
[1.33]
9:6:6
[1.5]
9:6:5
[1.5]
10:6:5
[1.67]
10:6:4
[1.67]
11:5:5
[2.2]
11:5:4
[2.2]
12:5:4
[2.4]
12:4:4
[3]
Fig. 5 Dot arrays of target items in Experiment 2. (Color figure online)
16 Both theories of most predict that trials rendering the test sentences true under the proportional reading
will indeed yield True judgments from speakers: the superlative reading is entailed whenever proportional
truth conditions are satisfied.
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The experiment contained 72 filler items, in addition to the 36 target items. Of the
filler items, 24 contained the determiner more than n for different ns, 24 contained
the determiner many, and 24 contained the determiner more than n % or more than
n/m for different ns and ms. In half of the filler trials, the correct answer was True
and in the other half it was False.
As before, the items were presented in surveys in one of 8 pseudo-randomized
orders where each pair of target items was separated by at least one filler item, and
the first item was not a target item. The survey, randomization process, and the
HTML templates used for this experiment were created using the turktools software
(Erlewine and Kotek, to appear). The surveys were posted on Amazon Mechanical
Turk. Participants were paid $0.20 for their participation. They were asked to
indicate their native language, but payment was not contingent on their response.
3.2.2 Results
Data from 251 native speakers of English who participated in this study was
included in the analysis. Of those, 135 subjects participated in the ‘most’ condition
and 116 participated in the ‘more than half’ condition. Three participants were
excluded from the analysis because of low accuracy rates (\75 % for the more than
n trials);17 nine were excluded because they were non-native speakers; and 62
participants were excluded because they did not complete one or more trials.18,19
Figure 6 shows the average percentage of True responses to most statements on
the left and to more than half statements on the right for the 9 Weber ratios of
Experiment 2. Each COLOR condition is plotted separately. For all four COLOR
conditions, we observe a clear inflection point: for Weber ratios [1—where the
truth conditions of most and more than half predict that the statements in (12)–(13)
are true—the percentage of True responses is above 65 % for the ratio 1.1 and near
90 % for the other data points. For Weber ratios  1—where the proportional truth
conditions of most and more than half predict that the corresponding most and more
than half statements are false—the percentage of True responses is very low.
Importantly, we also see in Fig. 6 an effect of the COLOR manipulation in the
‘superlative’ trials for most but not for more than half such that most yielded more
True judgments in the conditions with Weber ratios  1. To discuss this in more
detail, let us examine the four graphs in Fig. 7. These graphs compare participants’
17 Three additional subjects would be excluded if accuracy were calculated based on all of the fillers.
Here we chose to exclude only based on more than n items because these had the same blue:non-blue
ratios as the target items.
18 As an anonymous reviewer points out, this is quite a large number of participants to exclude, but given
the fact that there were 108 trials in total and that they were all presented on a single page on a computer
screen one after another, it is not at all surprising that many participants inadvertently skipped one or
more trials.
19 Two additional participants would be excluded if an 80 % accuracy rate were used. In addition, if
accuracy on all filler items were used instead of accuracy only on more than n items, a total of 6
additional participants would be excluded (that is, 12 instead of 6, which are excluded with the 75 % rate).
None of these choices affect the statistical findings that we report below: they remain intact under all of
these possible exclusion criteria.
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behavior for each COLOR condition for most and more than half. Recall that
DETERMINER was a between-subject factor and that participants saw the same
pictures matched with a most statement in the ‘most’ condition and with a more than
half statement in the ‘more than half’ condition. Several effects of interest are
apparent in these graphs.
Zooming in on the behavior of most for Weber ratios  1 in the different COLOR
conditions, we observe a difference in the behavior of most compared to more than
half. Although all pictures have Weber ratios  1 (false under proportional truth
conditions), some pictures have Color ratios [1 (true under superlative truth
conditions). These pictures are: (a) in the UNBALANCED condition, data point 5
(Weber ratio = 1; Color ratio = 1.11); (b) in the MILDLY BALANCED condition, data
points 3–5 (Weber ratios = 0.82, 0.91, 1; Color ratios = 1.13, 1.25, 1.42); and (c) in
the BALANCED condition, data points 1–5 (Weber ratios = 0.65, 0.75, 0.82, 0.91, 1;
Color ratios = 1.33, 1.5, 1.5, 1.67, 1.67). As can be observed in Figs. 6 and 7, we see
an increase in True responses to most statements compared to more than half
statements precisely in these 9 pictures.20
Fig. 6 Percent-True for most (left) and more than half (Mth, right) in Experiment 2. (Color figure online)
Fig. 7 Comparison of most and more than half (Mth) broken down by COLOR conditions
20 One additional finding is an unexpectedly high rate of True answers to the ‘false’-trials in the 3C
MILDLY BALANCED condition and some trials in the 3C UNBALANCED condition. In Sect. 3.3 we will argue
that this is a spurious finding, which is the result of noisy pictures in those trials and is unrelated to the
experimental manipulations in Experiment 2.
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Turning now to the 2C graph, which contains data from the same pictures that
were used in Experiment 1 (see Fig. 4), we can again clearly observe the behavioral
asymmetry of most: most behaves the same as more than half for Weber ratios  1:
it is judged True at very low rates, close to 0 %. For Weber ratios[1, however, the
behavior of most diverges from that of more than half. More than half is symmetric
and sharply changes from True rates close to 0 % to True rates close to 100 %
precisely when its truth conditions predict that it would: at the first Weber ratio[1.
Most, on the other hand, has a more gradual increase in True judgments for Weber
ratios[1, and even at the highest Weber ratio, 1.5, it is still judged True less often
than more than half. In fact, as the graphs in Fig. 7 indicate, in Weber ratios[1 for
all COLOR conditions, most is consistently judged True less often than more than half
for the True Weber ratios.21 This is the same pattern that we observed in Experiment
1. We will expand on this point in Sect. 3.3.
A mixed-effects logit model was fit to the data. The model examines the effect of
WEBER RATIOS (with 9 levels as specified in Table 3 above), COLOR RATIOS (with 26
levels as specified in Table 3 above), and DETERMINER (most vs. more than half) on
percent-True. The random effect structure includes random intercepts for both
subjects and items, and by-subject random slopes for the effects of WEBER RATIOS.22
The fixed effects are summarized in Table 4. The correlations among the fixed
effects are all within ±0.4, with the exception of a strong correlation between the
main effect of DETERMINER and the main effect of WEBER RATIOS and the interaction
of these two factors.
The results show main effects of DETERMINER and of WEBER RATIOS. That is, we
find that most is verified differently than more than half, but they are both affected
by the WEBER RATIOS manipulation. Additionally, we find a DETERMINER 9 WEBER
RATIOS interaction, such that more than half is affected by the WEBER RATIOS
manipulation more than most is, and a DETERMINER 9 COLOR RATIOS interaction, such
that most is affected by the COLOR RATIOS manipulation more than more than half is.
Table 4 Summary of the fixed effects in Experiment 2
Predictor Coefficient SE z value p
Intercept −22.1089 1.3689 −16.151 \0.001
DETERMINER 8.2047 1.3492 6.081 \0.001
WEBER RATIOS 20.1878 1.4169 14.248 \0.001
COLOR RATIOS 0.5504 0.4510 1.220 0.222
DETERMINER 9 WEBER RATIOS −9.4825 1.3114 −7.231 \0.001
DETERMINER 9 COLOR RATIOS 1.5190 0.2893 5.251 \0.001
Bold values are statistically significant
21 An inspection of individual subjects reveals that this behavior cannot be attributed to some small
subset of participants who consistently judged most trials in our ‘true’-conditions as False.
22 A model that also included the ratio of blue to red dots in the array did not converge (recall that COLOR
RATIOS indicate the blue to red ratio in our pictures). A model that also includes superlative and
proportional truth conditions reveals similar effects to the ones reported above, but suffers from a high
degree of colinearity because of the inclusion of the WEBER RATIOS and COLOR RATIOS predictions.
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3.2.3 Discussion
We see twomain effects in Experiment 2:WEBER RATIOS and DETERMINER.We find that
Weber ratios affect the verification of bothmost andmore than half such that the True
responses to both most and more than half statements increase as the ratio of blue to
non-blue increases. The main effect of DETERMINER indicates that most is judged True
more often than more than half is. As can be seen in Fig. 6, this result is caused by the
‘superlative’ pictures in the ‘most’ condition, where we observe that most statements
are judged True more often thanmore than half statements are. In fact, as this observe
suggests, the main effect of DETERMINER is driven by the DETERMINER 9
COLOR RATIOS interaction—that is, we see an increase in True responses to ‘superlative’
pictures for most but not more than half. The DETERMINER 9WEBER RATIOS interaction
suggests that Weber ratios contribute more to the verification of more than half than to
the verification of most. This is so because, as we have seen, more factors contribute to
the verification of most statements than of more than half statements, and these factors
mediate the contribution of the Weber ratios themselves.
One final result of Experiment 2 is the replication of Experiment 1 in the 2-COLOR
condition: we again observe the asymmetric behavior of most, where ‘false’ trials are
judged as False close to 100% of the time, but ‘true’ trials are judged as True only 90%
of the time or less. For more than half, by comparison, we find no difference between
the verification of False and True trials: both are at close to 100 %. Furthermore, as in
Experiment 1, we see that trials withWeber ratio= 1 are verified as False close to 90%
of the time. These results suggest that although participants in Experiment 2 were
exposed to many more pictures than participants in Experiment 1, the diversity of the
pictures and the increase in the number of decisions required did not change the nature
of the judgments that we observed in the two experiments. That is, we find no evidence
for a difference in participants’ strategies across the two experiments.
3.3 Implications: most in subject position has a genuine superlative reading
In this section we discuss the results of Experiments 1 and 2 with regard to the debate
over the correct analysis of most. We will show that postulating a superlative reading
of bare most in subject position explains the pattern of results observed in the
experiments, and we argue that these results are not predicted under the lexical view.
Recall that the starting point for our experiments was the comparison between a
lexical and a structural view of most. The lexical view predicts that bare most only
has proportional truth conditions, while the structural view predicts that bare most is
ambiguous between the two readings in (14), repeated from (7) above.
(14) a. Most of the dots are blue
b. Proportional truth conditions:
|blue dots|[|non-blue dots|
c. Superlative truth conditions:
For each non-blue color Z, |blue dots|[|Z dots|
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For the superlative reading to be detectable, dot arrays in the ‘superlative’
condition are required. That is, we need pictures that make a most statement false
under proportional truth conditions but true under superlative truth conditions. If
speakers verify most statements only according to proportional truth conditions, we
expect them to judge Most of the dots are blue as false for such pictures. If they can
access superlative truth conditions, they will be able to judge the same statement as
true for those pictures. All speakers are expected to judge a more than half statement
as false when verified against those same pictures.
Previous experimental works (Lidz et al. 2011; Tomaszewicz 2011; Heim et al.
2012) have shown that most is sensitive to Weber’s law such that most statements
are more difficult to verify in arrays with close blue:non-blue ratios compared to
arrays in which the two numerosities are further apart. Experiment 1 showed that
this result holds not only when the arrays are presented for very short durations but
also when participants are given as much time as they need to make their decision.
Experiment 2 built on the Weber ratios manipulation of Experiment 1 and
compared subjects’ behavior with respect to ‘superlative’ pictures in which not only
the blue:non-blue ratio was varied, but also the composition of the non-blue set. We
tested three different ‘superlative’ conditions, where the ratios of blue:yellow and
blue:red dots (Color ratios) were systematically varied. Following Weber’s law, we
suspected that if participants use a ‘superlative’ verification strategy to verify most
statements, the ease with which they use this strategy will be affected by the ratios
of the blue:yellow and blue:red comparisons. If the ratios are closer to 1, the
verification of a most statement will be difficult; on the other hand, as the ratios get
larger, speakers will have an easier time verifying the statement as true under
superlative truth conditions.
Indeed, Experiment 2 showed that when speakers verify most statements,
‘superlative’ pictures were judged true more often than other pictures with the same
blue:non-blue ratio that were false under the superlative reading. Furthermore, there
was an increase in the rate of True answers to most statements as the Color ratios
increased. This pattern is consistent with the view that bare most has a superlative
reading and it is inconsistent with the view that bare most only has a proportional
reading that is truth-conditionally equivalent to more than half.
Upon closer examination of the ‘superlative’ pictures, we note that although the
rates of True responses to most statements were clearly above those for other
pictures with the same ratios that were not in the ‘superlative’ condition, these rates
were rather low overall and, in fact, almost without exception below 50 %. This
seems prima facie unexpected on the structural view, since this view predicts that
superlative pictures can be judged as true under the superlative reading of most. One
might thus expect substantial rates of True responses to ‘superlative’ pictures,
reflecting the superlative reading of most. However, this prediction can only be
made if the two readings of most are equally accessible to speakers during the
verification task. As was shown by Kotek et al. (2011a), the ambiguity of bare most
in subject position is in fact heavily biased in favor of the proportional reading. That
is, the superlative reading of most is latent and often masked by the more dominant
proportional reading. Moreover, Kotek et al. (2011a) showed that the superlative
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reading of most was only available to about one third of the speakers in each of their
three experiments. Assuming the same prevalence of the superlative reading in our
participants, this means that the rates of True responses to ‘superlative’ pictures
should be lower than the rates of True responses to pictures that are true on both the
proportional and the superlative reading. In the latter case a True response is
available to all speakers, under whichever reading they verify, while in the former a
True response is available only to some of the speakers some of the time.
To further investigate the hypothesis that the superlative reading was only
accessible to some of the participants in Experiment 2, below we classify
participants in the ‘most’ condition in Experiment 2 as “proportional” or
“superlative” speakers according to whether or not they accessed superlative truth
conditions in the verification of most.23 The criterion we use for this classification of
participants is given in (15).
(15) “Superlative” vs. “proportional” classification of participants in Experiment 2:
In proportionally-false pictures: if percent-True in 3C BALANCED[
percent-True in 3C UNBALANCED, then superlative; otherwise, proportional.
The idea is that if speakers do not use superlative truth conditions in the
verification of bare most, they will verify all proportionally-false trials as false with
the same error rate: that is, they are not more likely to reply True to pictures in the
‘superlative’ condition than to other pictures with the same Weber ratio that are
false under the superlative reading. On the other hand, speakers who use a
superlative verification strategy are more likely to verify a most statement as true in
‘superlative’ pictures compared to other pictures with the same Weber ratio that are
false under superlative truth conditions. Hence, if speakers replied True more often
in the 3C BALANCED condition (where all five proportionally-false trials could be
judged as true under superlative truth conditions) than in the 3C UNBALANCED
condition (where only one proportionally-false trial could be judged as true under
superlative truth conditions), we classify them as “superlative”; otherwise we
classify them as “proportional” speakers.24
Using the criterion in (15), we find that 79 participants in the most condition are
classified as “proportional” speakers, and the other 56 are classified as “superlative.”
These numbers are comparable with Kotek et al.’s (2011a) numbers. Figure 8 shows the
percentage of True responses to all target trials in Experiment 2 broken down by the
classification of “proportional” vs. “superlative”most speakers (most-prop vs.most-sup).
23 Kotek et al. (2011a) suggest that speakers for whom bare most is ambiguous between a proportional
and a superlative reading use both truth conditions in the verification of most statements in the same
study, rather than only using superlative truth conditions (speakers who consistently only used
proportional truth conditions in the verification of most were classified as “proportional” speakers).
Therefore, our classification refers to speakers’ ability to optionally use a ‘superlative’ verification
strategy, rather than singling out speakers who only use such a strategy.
24 We do not use the 2C condition in the classification, as it is likely to contain less noise than the 3C
conditions due to the relative simplicity of the task, and hence would make the criterion more inclusive.
Also, as the reader will see below, we will use the data from the 3C MILDLY BALANCED condition, which we
do not directly manipulate here, in our analysis.
138 H. Kotek et al.
123
The classification of speakers in Fig. 8 indeed sharpens the results: we find that
there is little variation among the different COLOR conditions for “proportional”
participants, but there is a strong effect within the “superlative” participants. In
particular, we see that in the case of most verified by “superlative” participants
(Fig. 8, left panel) all five ‘superlative’ trials in the 3C BALANCED condition, three
trials in the 3C MILDLY BALANCED condition, and the one trial in the 3C UNBALANCED
condition are judged true more often than in the case of most verified by
“proportional” participants (Fig. 8, right panel). This mirrors the design of the items
in Table 3, repeated below for convenience. Specifically, the items that exhibit an
increase in True-responses are those that are described in the white region on the left
side of Table 3. They are the items that use pictures in the ‘superlative’ condition:
they are true under a superlative reading as soon as the number of blue dots is
greater than the number of yellow and red dots separately (the superlative reading),
but false under a proportional reading.
To see whether the classification in (15) identifies internally consistent subgroups
of speakers in Experiment 2, we can compare the behavior of participants who were
classified as “proportional” and the behavior of participants in the ‘more than half’
Fig. 8 Percent-True for “superlative” (most-sup, left) vs. “proportional” (most-prop, right) most speakers
in Experiment 2. (Color figure online)
Table 3 (Repeated): Blue:yellow:red dots, and COLOR RATIOS (in brackets) in Experiment 2
TC
COLOR
Proportional most : False
8:12 9:12 9:11 10:11 10:10
Proportional most : True
11:10 11:9 12:9          12:8
2C 8:12
[0.67]
9:12
[0.75]
9:11
[0.82]
10:11
[0.91]
10:10
[1]
11:10
[1.1]
11:9
[1.22]
12:9
[1.33]
12:8
[1.5]
3C
UNBALANCED
8:11:1
[0.73]
9:11:1
[0.86]
9:10:1
[0.9]
10:10:1
[1]
10:9:1
[1.11]
11:9:1
[1.22]
11:8:1
[1.38]
12:8:1
[1.5]
12:7:1
[1.71]
3C  MILDLY 
BALANCED
8:9:3
[0.89]
9:9:3
[1]
9:8:3
[1.13]
10:8:3
[1.25]
10:7:3
[1.42]
11:7:3
[1.57]
11:6:3
[1.83]
12:7:2
[1.71]
12:6:2
[2]
3C
BALANCED
8:6:6
[1.33]
9:6:6
[1.5]
9:6:5
[1.5]
10:6:5
[1.67]
10:6:4
[1.67]
11:5:5
[2.2]
11:5:4
[2.2]
12:5:4
[2.4]
12:4:4
[3]
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condition. Since both groups of speakers are assumed to have verified most and
more than half using a proportional verification strategy exclusively, and since most
and more than half are truth-conditionally equivalent for those speakers, we expect
them to show similar verification behavior for most and more than half. More
specifically, we expect similar results to those found in Experiment 1; the relevant
figure (Fig. 4) is repeated here for convenience.
Since most is not sensitive to COLOR under the proportional reading, we expect to
see similar behavior across all four COLOR conditions of Experiment 2 for most and
more than half: we expect all false items to be verified as false at very high rates for
both most and more than half; we expect more than half to be verified as true at high
rates for all true items, and we expect most to be verified as true less often than more
than half for those same trials (in light of the behavioral asymmetry of most).
Figure 9 shows the comparison of “proportional” most speakers (most-prop) and
more than half, broken down by COLOR conditions.
Several effects can be observed in the graphs in Fig. 9. First, we observe that the
behavior of most largely tracks the behavior of more than half for proportionally-
false trials. This is as expected if the speakers we classified as “proportional” can
Fig. 4 (repeated): Average percentage of True responses in Experiment 1. (Color figure online)
Fig. 9 Comparison of “proportional” most speakers (most-prop) and more than half (Mth) broken down
by COLOR conditions. (Color figure online)
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access only a proportional reading for most. Moreover, we see that in proportion-
ally-true trials, most is consistently verified as true less often than more than half is.
More than half is generally verified as true at close to ceiling rates for all ‘true’
trials, but most is almost never verified at the same rates even at the highest Weber
ratio of 1.5. Finally, we observe that whatever noise is introduced by the particular
items used in Experiment 2 (see Figs. 5 and 6) affects most and more than half to the
same extent. This noise is particularly visible in the ‘false’ trials of the 3C MILDLY
BALANCED condition and some ‘false’ trials in the 3C UNBALANCED condition, but
importantly it does not have a greater effect on one determiner than the other. This
justifies the comparisons we have made here between most and more than half;
furthermore, it motivates close scrutiny of deviations in the verification of most by
“superlative” speakers that go beyond the baseline we have just seen.
Next let us compare the behavior of participants who were classified as
“superlative” with the behavior of participants who were classified as “proportional”
in the ‘most’ condition. Figure 10 shows the comparison of most-sup and most-prop,
broken down by COLOR conditions.
Figure 10 clearly demonstrates the presence of a superlative reading of most for
participants who were classified as “superlative” speakers. In general, we observe
that most statements are verified as true more often by “superlative” speakers than
by “proportional” speakers for all Weber ratios in all COLOR conditions. This
property of the “superlative” speakers is particularly pronounced in the ‘superlative’
pictures, where the rates of True responses to most statements are clearly above
those of parallel trials for “proportional” speakers, whose responses, in turn,
resemble rates of True responses observed earlier for more than half statements.
Furthermore, we observe that the rate of True responses to ‘superlative’ pictures
increases as the Color ratios increase, as expected based on the results of
Experiment 1 as well as the results of Lidz et al. (2011).
This finding is precisely what is predicted if bare most in subject position has a
latent superlative reading that is accessible to some speakers (that is, the
“superlative” speakers), but it is unexpected if most does not have such a reading.
If such a reading did not exist, we would expect to only see behavior consistent with
the proportional reading of most, but not the superlative reading of most. However,
we see a clear difference in the judgment patterns of “superlative” and
“proportional” speakers precisely in those pictures that correspond to the
Fig. 10 Comparison of “superlative” (most-sup) and “proportional” (most-prop) most speakers broken
down by COLOR conditions
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‘superlative’ condition—that is, pictures that can be judged as true under superlative
truth conditions even though they are false under proportional truth conditions.
It is particularly illuminating to compare the behavior of the two speaker groups
in the 3C MILDLY BALANCED condition: this condition did not enter into the
calculation used to classify speakers into the two groups in (15), and hence
represents the effect of this classification independent of the data used in the
classification itself. We observe that the four (proportionally and superlatively)
‘true’ ratios in this condition were verified as true with similar rates by
“proportional” and “superlative” speakers. Moreover, we can clearly observe that
the first two ratios on the left (false under both readings of most) were verified as
false at similar rates for both speaker groups, but the next three ratios, all
‘superlative’ conditions, exhibit a much higher rate of True responses in the
“superlative” group than in the “proportional” group. Recall that, as we observed in
Fig. 9, the increase in True rates for these pictures in “proportional” speakers is
parallel to that observed for more than half and hence likely reflects noise present in
our items, rather than superlative verification behavior. The increase observed
beyond that for “superlative” pictures cannot be similarly attributed to noise and
must correspond to a superlative verification strategy.
A logit mixed-effects model indeed confirms an interaction between SPEAKER-
TYPE and COLOR RATIOS, such that COLOR RATIOS better predict the verification
behavior of speakers who were classified as ‘superlative’ as opposed to those who
were classified as ‘proportional.’ The model predicted percent-True from SPEAKER-
TYPE and COLOR RATIOS for the first five data points on the left in the 3C MILDLY
BALANCED condition (all ratios that are false under proportional truth conditions of
most). The random effect structure was the maximal one supported by the design of
Experiment 2 and included by-item intercepts and by-participant slopes and
intercepts for SPEAKER-TYPE and COLOR RATIOS. The model also yielded a significant
main effect of COLOR RATIOS, but this main effect was highly correlated with the
interaction and we therefore do not put explanatory weight on it. All other
correlations among fixed effects were within ±0.15. This is consistent with the
results apparent in the graph in Fig. 10 and predicted by theories of most that treat it
as a superlative construction. The fixed effects of the model are summarized in
Table 5.
Finally, we note that if participants in the ‘more than half’ condition are classified
using the same method that was used in (15) above for most, no superlative behavior
is found in the data. This classification yields 94 subjects who are classified as
“proportional” (Mth-prop) and 22 who are classified as “superlative” (Mth-sup). As
Table 5 Summary of the fixed effects for the 3C MILDLY BALANCED condition with most
Predictor Coefficient SE z value p
Intercept −12.484 1.330 −9.385 \0.001
SPEAKER-TYPE −2.846 2.088 −1.363 0.1728
COLOR RATIOS 9.731 1.133 8.591 \0.001
SPEAKER-TYPE 9 COLOR RATIOS 4.790 1.770 2.706 \0.01
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can be observed in Fig. 11, the “proportional” behavior in the graph on the right was
made sharper by this classification. However, we find no indication of a superlative
verification strategy for the participants who were classified as “superlative.”
Instead, we observe that the verification behavior for these speakers is generally
more noisy; moreover, and importantly, we do not observe a selective increase in
True responses to trials in the ‘superlative’ condition, namely all five trials in the 3C
BALANCED condition, three trials in the 3C MILDLY BALANCED condition, and one trial
in the 3C UNBALANCED condition.
A mixed-effects logit model predicting percent-True from SPEAKER-TYPE and
COLOR RATIOS for the 3C MILDLY BALANCED condition for the more than half
participants (parallel to the one described for the most participants above) confirms
this finding. We find a main effect of COLOR RATIOS, but no effect of SPEAKER-TYPE
and no interaction. That is, we observe only one type of speaker in this data, unlike
the finding for most. The main effect of the COLOR RATIOS indicates that knowing the
ratio improves the model predictions compared to having no information about the
pictures at all. This is as expected, given that the COLOR RATIOS (correlated with
superlative truth conditions) and the WEBER RATIOS (correlated with proportional
truth conditions) converge for 6 out of the 9 ratios in the 3C MILDLY BALANCED
condition. The fixed effects of this model are summarized in Table 6.
We can thus verify that the classification we have used above is parsimonious in
grouping the noise in Experiment 2 together with the “superlative” data.
Furthermore, as predicted by the truth conditions of more than half, no superlative
behavior is observed even for those participants who were classified as “superlative”
by the criterion in (15). Hence, the superlative behavior we observe for most is not
Fig. 11 Percent-True for “superlative” more than half (Mth-sup, left) and “proportional” more than half
(Mth-prop, right) in Experiment 2. (Color figure online)
Table 6 Summary of the fixed effects for the 3C MILDLY BALANCED condition with more than half
Predictor Coefficient SE z value p
Intercept −23.215 3.513 −6.609 \0.001
SPEAKER-TYPE −6.263 5.434 −1.153 0.249
COLOR RATIOS 16.442 2.688 6.117 \0.001
SPEAKER-TYPE 9 COLOR RATIOS 5.803 3.906 1.486 0.137
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an artifact of our classification of subjects or of the design of our experiment.
Rather, it is genuinely attributable to the truth-conditional import of bare most. It is
explained under a decompositional approach to most, whereas it is not predicted by
the lexical ambiguity approach to most.
4 General discussion
In this section, we review the empirical results of Experiment 2 and their impact on
the debate as to the correct analysis of most. We then discuss differences between
most and more than half that emerge from both of our experiments, and, finally, we
discuss the differences between the findings in our study and the findings of Lidz
et al. (2011), who used a similar manipulation but did not find any evidence of
sensitivity of most to the number of colors in the pictures against which the most
statements were verified.
4.1 Proportional and superlative truth conditions for bare most
The goal of Experiment 2 was to test whether speakers can verify sentences like
(16a) using superlative truth conditions as in (16c) in addition to the proportional
truth conditions described in (16b).
(16) a. Most of the dots are blue
b. Proportional truth conditions:
|blue dots|[|non-blue dots|
c. Superlative truth conditions:
For each non-blue color Z, |blue dots|[|Z dots|
The data is quite clear. We saw that even when pooling data across all
participants the rates of True responses to ‘superlative’ pictures (pictures for which
the test statements were true under the reading described in (16c) but false under the
reading in (16b)) show sensitivity to the COLOR manipulation, namely to the
difference between the number of blue dots and the number of dots in the most
numerous non-blue color (the blue-to-highest-non-blue ratio). This is a signature
property of the superlative reading and thus indicates that at least some of our
participants verified the pictures using the truth conditions as described in (16c). It
cannot be explained if speakers had only access to a proportional reading, (16b),
since under that reading there should only be sensitivity to the blue-to-non-blue
ratio. Furthermore, we have seen that classifying participants into “superlative” and
“proportional” speakers sharpens the data considerably: for the “superlative” group
(about 40 % of our participants) the rates of True responses to superlative pictures
mirror perfectly the white portion of Table 3, indicating that they have a strong
preference to verify the arrays using a blue-to-highest-non-blue strategy. No such
strategy was detected for the “proportional” group. We conclude from these
observations that at least for our “superlative” speakers bare most in subject position
is ambiguous between a proportional and a genuine superlative construal.
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The fact that bare most in subject position can have a genuine superlative reading
(in addition to the proportional reading) is expected under the view where most is in
all its incarnations a superlative construction which gives rise to either proportional
or superlative truth conditions depending on how the comparison class is set. It is
not expected under the view where most is simply ambiguous between a lexical
determiner with proportional truth conditions (bare most) and a superlative
construction with superlative truth conditions (the most), since on that view bare
most is always unambiguously proportional. Our data shows, however, that bare
most is in fact ambiguous. To account for this, a lexical ambiguity approach would
have to stipulate that bare most itself is ambiguous between a proportional meaning
and a superlative meaning.25 This proliferation of lexical ambiguity is an
unwelcome consequence, especially since it offers no principled account of why
most is ambiguous between these two meanings rather than any other possible
(determiner) meanings or why most is ambiguous between a proportional and a
superlative meaning while similar determiners such as more than half are
unambiguously proportional.
In this connection, it is important to stress that the superlative-proportional
ambiguity also arises in other languages, for example in German, as discussed in
Hackl (2009), in Slavic, as discussed in Krasikova (2011), Szabolcsi (2012),
Pancheva (forthcoming), and elsewhere. This fact, too, speaks against the lexical
ambiguity account, as the latter offers no general perspective on the systematic
(un)availability of proportional and superlative meanings for expressions that
contain superlative morphosyntax. Moreover, just as in English, only determiners
that contain a superlative morpheme seem to give rise to this ambiguity
across languages: quantifiers such as more than half do not exhibit such an
ambiguity.26
4.2 Most vs. more than half
In this section we return to the discussion of the asymmetric behavior of most, which
is not apparent in the behavior of more than half in either Experiment 1 or
25 For example, an anonymous reviewer suggests the following custom-tailored lexical ambiguity theory:
(i) ⟦most⟧(A)(B) = 1 iff for all ‘appropriate’ Y ⊆ A−B, |A \ B| [ | Y |
– Dominant: Y can only be A−B itself
– Latent: Y can range over salient subsets of A−B
Note, however, that this proposal looks rather similar to the superlative-based treatment proposed in
Hackl (2009) and summarized in (4b) and (5b) above. It differs only in that no reference to degrees or to
the degree quantifier expressed by -est is acknowledged. It thus prompts the question why its meaning is
related to the meaning of the superlative construction the most. Furthermore, this account does not give a
principled explanation as to why only these two interpretations are attested––in particular, why
interpretations such as Y = the smallest subset of A–B, or Y = two or more subsets of A–B, are
unattested, despite being in principle sensible.
26 To be sure, the decompositional view of most faces remaining challenges, as noted by an anonymous
reviewer. In particular: (i) the presence/absence of the definite article; (ii) the tendency of most but not the
most to have a generic interpretation when combining with a plural noun, and to prefer a partitive
construction in episodic sentences. These issues are beyond the scope of this paper, but see Pancheva (to
appear) for a recent attempt to explain the interaction with the definite article.
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Experiment 2. In both experiments we saw that in the 2C condition,27 the
verification behavior of more than half resembles a step function that changes
sharply from True rates close to zero for all ‘false’ trials to True rates close to 100 %
for all ‘true’ trials. For most, we observe parallel low True rates for all ‘false’ trials,
but the True rates are lower than those of more than half for all ‘true’ trials,
Furthermore, the first ‘true’ ratio for most yields True judgments only 77 % of the
time, while other ratios yield True judgments 90 % of the time or more. Although
never formally recognized or explained in any previous literature on most, this
asymmetry has been observed for most in prior experimental work (Yosef
Grodzinsky, p.c.).
We believe that this finding can be related to an observation regarding the
pragmatics of the use of most and more than half. In particular, more than half is
used for proportions that are above but still close to 50 %, while most tends to imply
proportions that are significantly higher than 50 % (Peterson 1979; Westerstahl
1985; Horn 2005; cf. Ariel 2004 for a similar observation for the Hebrew rov
‘most’).28 This observation has recently been verified through corpus work by Solt
(to appear), who examined the use of most and more than half in the Corpus of
Contemporary American English (COCA; Davies 2008) and found that more than
half was typically used to describe percentages between 50 and 65 %, while most
was rarely used for percentages below 60 %. Below are some examples from the
COCA corpus, taken from Solt (to appear).
(17) a. The survey showed that most students (81.5 %) do not use websites for
math-related assignments. (Education 129(1), 56–79, 2008)
b. Most respondents—63 %—said the best movie for date night is a comedy.
(Redbook 208(6), 158, 2007)
c. Most Caucasian grandparents were married (67 %), had attained an
education level above high school (64 %), and lived on an annual
household income above $20,000. (74 %). (Journal of Instructional
Psychology 24(2), 119, 1997)
(18) a. More than half of respondents (55 %) say that making money is more
important now than it was five years ago. (Money 21(3), 72, 1992)
b. More than half of the respondents (60 %) earned Ph.D. degrees. (Physical
Educator 53(4), 170, 1996)
c. And while more than half of us grill year-round (57 %), summertime is
overwhelmingly charcoal time. (Denver Post, May 24, 2000)
Solt (to appear) describes several additional differences between most and more
than half that stem from the kinds of nouns that these two determiners normally
combine with (kind vs. group denoting), the overall higher frequency in the corpus
27 The 2C condition is the only condition where there is no interference from the COLOR manipulation.
Because of this complicating interference in the other COLOR conditions, we restrict the discussion above
to the 2C condition. However, the same observation holds for all conditions for participants who we
classified as “proportional” most speakers in Sect. 3.3.
28 Here we will not discuss previous attempts to build this property of most into its semantics.
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of most compared to more than half, and their normal usage to describe generic vs.
‘survey result’ readings, respectively. Solt also shows that most is used more often
with vague and uncountable domains, while more than half appears less compatible
with such domains, as illustrated in (19) (also from Solt, to appear).29
(19) a. But like most things, obesity is not spread equally across social classes.
b. ?But like more than half of things, obesity is not spread equally across
social classes.
Solt proposes a formal account of these differences between most and more than
half based on the interaction of their logical forms with different measurement scale
structures.
We see, then, that although most and more than half are truth-conditionally
equivalent, they are used in different contexts. This finding is consistent with the
results of Experiments 1 and 2. First, both determiners are false under the exact
same conditions, and hence we expect them to be judged as false at very high rates
for all ‘false’ conditions. However, while the two determiners are true in all the
same cases, they are not used in the same way: more than half is more often used for
proportions that are close to 50 %, and most is more often used for proportions
significantly higher than 50 %. This fact may have contributed to the difference in
rates of True judgments for most and more than half: the rate of True responses to
our trials may reflect the felicity of the corresponding statement in the context.
As we have seen, participants verify more than half statements as true at very
high rates for all ‘true’ ratios, including those that are very close to a Weber ratio of
1: these are contexts in which more than half is often used felicitously. On the other
hand, most is used less often in such contexts, and hence most is judged as true less
often in these cases. As the Weber ratio increases, the percentage of speakers who
find the most statement felicitous increases too. Furthermore, since the highest
proportion of blue dots found in our pictures was only 60 % of the total number of
dots, we can understand why even at the highest Weber ratio in our experiments,
more than half is consistently judged as true more often than most for all COLOR
conditions: as Solt shows, 60 % is still within the range of percentages for which
speakers tend to prefer to use more than half as opposed to most.
To conclude, the asymmetry property of most seems to be related to the
pragmatics of its usage. Although most is true in the same cases as more than half
(under proportional truth conditions), it is less often used to describe pictures with
the proportions that were found in our experiments, compared to more than half.
Furthermore, it is predicted that both determiners will be clearly judged as false in
all ‘false’ pictures because the conditions of their use entail that both most and more
than half statements are infelicitous in such cases. Finally, we note that our data
does not speak to the question of whether the distributional facts of most are the
underlying cause of the asymmetry we observed or whether the semantic properties
29 For related observations about most and the most and their counterparts in Hungarian, Russian, and
German see Szabolcsi (2012).
Experimental investigations of ambiguity 147
123
of most, e.g. along the lines of Solt (to appear), are responsible for both the
distributional data and the asymmetry in our results.30
4.3 Comparison with Lidz et al. (2011)
In this section we review the results of a previous sentence verification study of most
conducted by Lidz et al. (2011), which, even though similar to our study inmanyways,
obtained different findings than those we reported above.31 Although it was not the
explicit goal of Lidz et al. to test whether baremost has a superlative reading in subject
position, their study directly bears on the question of whether such a reading exists. In
particular, while we have found that most is ambiguous between a dominant
proportional reading and a latent superlative reading, the results of Lidz et al. suggest
thatmost is unambiguous and has only the proportional reading. Belowwe surveyLidz
et al.’s study and investigate potential sources for the conflict between their findings
and ours. We argue that the source of the difference lies in the different task demands
and in the way the results of the two studies were interpreted.
4.3.1 A brief summary of Lidz et al. (2011)
Lidz et al. (2011) examine the verification of the question Are most of the dots
blue? with respect to dot arrays of varying complexities. Arrays varied along two
dimensions: (a) the Weber ratio of blue:non-blue dots (1:2, 2:3, 3:4, and 4:5; in
half of the cases the blue dots outnumbered the non-blue dots); and (b) the
number of colors used in the arrays (2, 3, 4, or 5). The goal of the study was to
test a prediction of the standard Generalized Quantifier Theory (GQT) approach
to most, given in (20), when combined with the hypothesis that when speakers
have to determine the truth/falsity of a sentence, they are biased towards
verification strategies that employ operations specified as part of the truth-
conditional import of the statement—Lidz et al.’s Interface Transparency Thesis
(ITT), given in (21).
(20) ⟦most⟧(A)(B) = 1 iff |A \ Β|[|Α − Β| Standard GQT
(21) Interface Transparency Thesis (ITT; Lidz et al. 2011, p. 234):
The verification procedures employed in understanding a declarative sentence
are biased towards algorithms that directly compute the relations and
operations expressed by the semantic representation of that sentence.
30 An anonymous reviewer asks whether the most exhibits the same asymmetry that bare most does. If
only one determiner exhibits this property but not the other, the decompositional approach to most will
face a challenge explaining this fact. We note that Kotek et al. (2011b) show that outside of a particular
syntactic configuration, the most in subject position is infelicitous for many English speakers, making it
impossible to test the most in the same experimental setting used for bare most in the present paper.
31 The results of Lidz et al. (2011) also differ from the findings in Kotek et al. (2011a), which were
consistent with the findings of our Experiment 2: that bare most in subject position is ambiguous between
a dominant proportional reading and a latent superlative reading.
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Lidz et al. (2011) argue that given (20) and the ITT, speakers are expected to
employ a verification strategy that enumerates the blue dots and the non-blue dots
and compares the two numbers. For this to be feasible, they argue, it is necessary to
select and attend to the non-blue set. However, it has been shown that (at least under
extremely short exposure times) it is impossible for the visual system to select a set
of objects based on a “negative” feature such as non-blue (Wolfe 1998; Treisman
and Gormican 1988; Treisman and Souther 1985; see discussion in Lidz et al. 2011).
Instead, in order to select the non-blue set, it is necessary to select the subsets of
homogeneously colored dots that make up the non-blue set. Lidz et al. reason that
this step of selecting each subset of homogeneously colored dots should be sensitive
to the number of colors used in the arrays. Therefore, if determining the cardinalities
of all the homogeneously colored subsets of non-blue dots is part of the verification
procedure of most statements, increasing the number of colors in the arrays should
make the verification of most increasingly difficult.
To test this prediction, Lidz et al.’s study presented their dot arrays for only 150 ms.
Thismade a verification strategy based on counting all the dots individually impossible;
it alsomade it impossible for the visual system todirectly select the non-blue set. Instead,
participants had to rely on estimating the cardinality of whatever sets they used in the
verification process. Importantly, estimating the cardinality of a set is a process whose
accuracy is governed by the Weber ratio and for which there exist well-established
psychophysical models (e.g., Pica et al. 2004).Moreover, as Halberda et al. (2006) have
shown, the number of sets whose cardinality participants can successfully estimate at
such brief exposure times is limited: participants can estimate the cardinality of the set of
all dots and, in addition, of up to two homogenously colored subsets of dots. Thus, when
a task requires estimatingmore than two subsets in addition to the total set, performance
drops off markedly. Based on this observation, Lidz et al. reasoned that verifying most
statements using a strategy that requires estimating the size of each homogenously
colored subset of dots individually shouldbemarkedlymoredifficult; it shouldno longer
bepredicted by theWeber ratiowhen thenumberof colors used in the array is 3, 4, or 5.32
However, this is not what they found in their study. Rather, their results, shown below in
Fig. 12 from Lidz et al. (2011), indicate a marked lack of sensitivity to the number of
colors in the array, as well as a strong dependency on the Weber ratio.
Since their results show no effect of COLOR, Lidz et al. (2011) conclude that the
composition of the non-blue set could not have played a direct role in the
verification of the most statements. To account for this insensitivity to the number of
colors used in the arrays, Lidz et al. propose the analysis of most in (22b) in place of
the more traditional GQT treatment in (22a).33
32 Whether performance should break down when there are 3 colors in the array or only when there are 4
or more is somewhat unclear given the results in Halberda et al. (2006). Whatever the answer to this
question may be, it does not change the interpretation of the experiment in Lidz et al., since there was no
effect of color across all levels.
33 To make this argument, Lidz et al. rely on additional assumptions that provide a bridge between the
two hypotheses in (22) and how speakers verify statements in general. An in-depth discussion of these
assumptions would lead us too far afield here, and it is peripheral to our main argument—that most must
be analyzed as a superlative structure—because both (22a) and (22b) are inconsistent with the superlative
behavior observed in our study.
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(22) a. ⟦most⟧(A)(B) = 1 iff |A \ Β|[|Α − Β| Standard GQT
b. ⟦most⟧(A)(B) = 1 iff |A \ B|[|A| − |A \ B| Lidz et al. (2011)
Lidz et al. (2011) argue that under the ITT, (22b) differs from (22a) in that it
only requires determining the cardinality of all the dots in the array (|A|) and the
cardinality of the blue set (|A \ B|). With these two quantities established,
the cardinality of the non-blue set can now be calculated as |A| − |A \ B|. That is,
the non-blue set need not be estimated as the sum of the cardinalities of all the
homogeneously colored non-blue subsets.
The specific assumptions underlying this argument deserve closer scrutiny; we
will return to them in Sect. 4.3.3. For now, we simply point out that the lack of an
effect of COLOR in Lidz et al.’s (2011) experiment implies that bare most could not
have been verified using a superlative verification strategy. Such a strategy would
have required the estimation of each homogeneously colored subset of the non-blue
set separately, and that behavior is predicted to be sensitive to COLOR. Instead, only
proportional truth conditions could have been available to participants in Lidz
et al.’s experiment. This appears to be in conflict with the present study. As our
experiment shows, superlative truth conditions are in principle available to some
speakers who verify most statements. Lidz et al.’s proposal (just like the standard
GQT treatment), however, only allows for proportional truth conditions. As such, it
is a version of the lexical view of most and so cannot straightforwardly account for
the superlative behavior found in our results.
4.3.2 The role of task demands in sentence veriﬁcation
In this section we discuss key differences between the study reported here and Lidz
et al.’s (2011) work and argue that the specific design and task demands of the
experiment in Lidz et al. played a critical role in obtaining the result that the COLOR
Fig. 12 Results of the most experiment in Lidz et al. (2011). Reproduced with the authors’ permission
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manipulation had no effect. This, in turn, casts doubt on the generalizability of the
results and on the robustness of the conclusions drawn from that study.
Recall that both studies explored the verification of bare most in subject position
through experiments that manipulated the COLOR and WEBER RATIOS of the dots in the
pictures against which a most statement was verified. The present study also used a
DETERMINERmanipulation to compare the behavior ofmost to that ofmore than half. Lidz
et al. (2011) found an effect of WEBER RATIOS but no effect of COLOR, insofar as all four
COLOR conditions in their experiment were verified with similar levels of accuracy. The
present study found an effect ofWEBER RATIOS as well, but in addition it found an effect of
COLOR formost but notmore than half, such thatmost statementswere consistently judged
as true significantly more often for ‘superlative’ pictures than for pictures with the same
Weber ratios that were false under the superlative reading. A similar effect of COLOR was
also found inKotek et al. (2011a),whoused aCOLORmanipulationwithWeber ratios very
close to 1 and found that pictures that contained three colors and were true only under the
superlative reading were judged as true more often than corresponding pictures with the
same ratios that contained just twocolors.This result ledKotek et al. (2011a) aswell as the
present study to adopt a view ofmost that is compatible with the structural view ofmost,
under which most is the superlative form of many (Hackl 2009).
We see, then, that bothLidz et al. and the present study use aCOLORmanipulation and
aWEBER RATIOS manipulation. However, only the present study, following Kotek et al.,
also uses a DETERMINER manipulation; this manipulation helps to ensure that whatever
results are obtained for most can be attributed to the semantics and verification
procedures associated with most, rather than some general difficulty related to the
design of the experiment or to its participants. If experimental designwere the issue, we
would expect the verification ofmore than half to be affected in a similar manner to that
of most. Similarly, if most is unambiguously a proportional determiner and truth-
conditionally equivalent tomore than half, as predicted by the lexical view ofmost, we
would expect any experimental manipulation to affect these two determiners equally.
One important source of difference between the experiments is the mode of
presentation of dot arrays in them. We saw that the experiments in the present study
allowed participants unlimited time tomake their decision. The Lidz et al. experiment,
on the other hand, used a flash presentation method: participants saw the dot arrays for
150 ms and were asked to answer the question Are most of the dots blue? based on
whatever information they could gather within that time frame.Moreover, participants
were always asked the very same question: Are most of the dots blue?, where the color
of the dotswas not varied and no fillers were used, for 400 trials in all.Wewould like to
suggest that this design and the specific task demands it imposed on participants biased
them toward using a verification strategy such as the one derivable from combining the
ITT with (22b). The flash presentation allowed participants to gather enough
information to support a verification strategy compatible with proportional truth
conditions in all of the experimental conditions, irrespective of whether there were 2,
3, 4, or 5 colors in a given array. A superlative verification strategy requiring estimates
for the number of dots in each color, by contrast, was only supported in half of the
conditions—when the arrays contained 2 or 3 colors but notwhen they contained 4 or 5
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colors.34 Given that participants encountered the very same question 400 times in a
row, it is likely that they acted strategically and adopted a verification procedure that
could guarantee a successful verification of the question in all cases—that is, a strategy
compatible with proportional truth conditions.35 Thus, we think the extreme task
demands imposed on participants in this study cast doubt on whether the verification
strategy that was observed indeed reflects the underlying components of the truth
conditions of most and the way that they are stated, as assumed by Lidz et al. Instead,
the behavior displayed by participantsmight reflect a less transparent translation of the
truth conditions of most into a strategy that could guarantee successful verification of
the most statement in all experimental conditions, regardless of the specific
composition of a given dot array. Thus, while the proposal in (22b) might indeed
correctly reflect the behavior of participants in Lidz et al.’s study, it is not obvious that
it should be viewed as reflecting the underlying truth conditions ofmost outside of Lidz
et al.’s experimental settings.
To put it differently, Lidz et al.’s argument that the semantic import of most is to
be stated as in (22b) rather than as in (22a) or, for that matter, in terms of a
superlative semantics as we argue here, relies on stating the ITT in a way that does
not take into account the specific task demands under which speakers might engage
in verification. This is unrealistic. Moreover, it can create the false impression, as is
the case here, of conflicting data. A more realistic version of the ITT, which avoids
drawing inconsistent inferences from experimental data about the underlying
semantics of an expression, would make the ITT sensitive to the task demands.
Thus, minimally an amendment of the following sort is in order:
(23) The modiﬁed Interface Transparency Thesis (mITT)
When determining the truth/falsity of a statement in a given situation,
speakers exhibit a bias towards using verification procedures that employ
operations specified as part of the truth-conditional import of the statement,
as supported by the task demands brought about by that situation.
An amendment of the ITT to include sensitivity to specific task demands makes
inferring semantic properties of expressions from verification data less direct than
Lidz et al. assumed. In particular, for a given linguistic expression there may be
several kinds of “default” verification strategies and speakers might choose among
those according to the specific experimental conditions. Thus, for any given
experimental setting, verification data can be explained only by combining
34 Recall that following work by Halberda et al. (2006), in conditions like those that obtained in the
experiment of Lidz et al. (2011) participants are able to estimate the total number of dots in the array, and
additionally the sizes of up to two homogeneously colored subsets of dots.
35 An anonymous reviewer proposes further that given the lack of fillers in the Lidz et al. (2011) study, it
is possible that participants in that study interpreted the task as simply deciding whether or not there were
more blue dots than other dots in the arrays presented to them, effectively ignoring the prompt they were
given.
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hypotheses about the semantics of the studied expression with an (ideally
independently justified) theory of the task.36
Conflicting experimental results represent a challenge, but we argue that in the
present case a resolution can be found by assuming that the underlying semantics of
most is superlative in nature. Under this assumption, the results of the present study
(as well as those reported in Kotek et al. 2011a) are straightforwardly explained,
while the results of Lidz et al. (2011) can be accounted for under the additional
assumption that speakers strategically worked with the proportional reading, which,
following Lidz et al., can be represented as in (22b). By contrast, on the view that
the semantics of most is underlyingly as in (22b), only the data in Lidz et al. is
explained. The superlative behavior we found in the present study is not
understandable on those terms alone since the task demands of our study do not
impinge on a verification strategy that is based on (22b). Thus, there is, prima facie,
no reason to expect that speakers should not employ the same verification strategy
that they did in Lidz et al.’s experiment.
4.3.3 The asymmetry of most and ANS models
In the previous subsection we argued that the main inconsistency between the
present study and the Lidz et al. study—the presence/absence of an effect of COLOR
—is resolved once we assume a superlative semantics for most in conjunction with a
modified ITT, which allows for the specific task demands in a verification setting to
influence which verification procedure is chosen by speakers as the strategically
most advantageous. The current section briefly discusses another, somewhat less
critical inconsistency between the two studies.
Recall from the discussion of Experiment 1 that in the case of most we observe an
asymmetry between the rates of True responses for Weber ratios above 1 and the
rates of False responses for Weber ratios below 1: while the latter are close to zero
for all relevant ratios (and are no different from the rates of no responses for more
than half for all those Weber ratios) the former are lower than the corresponding
True rates for more than half, for all ratios except the highest one. Moreover, we
saw that the rate of True responses for Weber ratio 1 was close to zero, indicating
that speakers were confidently judging the most statement to be false in this case.
Neither observation is apparent in Lidz et al.’s reported data (see Fig. 12), since
they assumed that the verification process of most statements can be faithfully
modeled as a symmetric discrimination task between two quantities represented by
the Approximate Number System (ANS).37,38 Under this model, it is possible to
assume that the rate of True responses at Weber ratio 1 is 50 %, since two equal
36 This is, of course, generally true for all behavior that linguistic theories aim to explain, and not just for
sentence verification paradigms (cf. Marantz 2005).
37 The ANS is an evolutionarily ancient cognitive mechanism that is able to generates an approximate
representation of the number of items in a set, in accord with Weber’s law: the discriminability of two
quantities is a function of their ratio; discriminability increases as the Weber ratio increases.
38 Modeling the verification task as a symmetric discrimination task means, informally speaking, that
participants were assumed to determine in each verification trial whether n[m or m[n (with n
representing the estimated cardinality of blue dots and m the estimated cardinality of the non-blue dots).
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ANS quantities are maximally confusable. Moreover, it is now legitimate to
collapse response rates for Weber ratios and their multiplicative inverses, as Lidz
et al. indeed do, to produce the data that was subsequently modeled using an
independently provided psycho-physical model of the ANS. However, the fact that
our results do not support these assumptions indicates that the use of ANS modeling
as the basis for the study of most may not be justified in the general case.
5 Conclusion
This paper has introduced new evidence regarding the correct semantics of bare
most. Previous sentence verification studies of most have yielded diverging results:
Kotek et al. (2011a) find that most is ambiguous between a dominant proportional
reading and a latent superlative reading, while the findings in Lidz et al. (2011) are
consistent with most being unambiguously proportional and truth-conditionally
equivalent to more than half.
Here, we presented the results of a study that combined the manipulations of the
two previous studies and showed that bare most does indeed have a superlative
reading in subject position. In particular, we find an effect of the number of colors in
the pictures for most but not for more than half precisely in those pictures where the
test sentences were true under superlative truth condition (but false under
proportional truth conditions). This reflects the fact that most, but not more than
half, can be verified using a verification strategy that is compatible with superlative
truth conditions.
This result is compatible with a decompositional analysis of most, according to
which both the most and bare most are built from the same basic ingredients—a
gradable predicate MANY and the superlative operator -est—but project different
LFs, as laid out e.g. in Hackl (2009). The results are unexpected under the lexical
view of most, where bare most and the most are unrelated lexical items, with bare
most exclusively expressing proportional semantics and the most exclusively
expressing superlative semantics.
We explained the differences between the findings of our study and those of Lidz
et al. (2011) study as stemming from differences in the task demands, which may
have biased participants in the latter study towards using a verification strategy that
is only compatible with proportional truth conditions. We have argued that such a
strategy is guaranteed to succeed in all trials in Lidz et al.’s study, while a strategy
compatible with superlative truth conditions is expected to fail in 50 % of the trials.
This makes it unsurprising that no evidence of a superlative reading of bare most
was found in that earlier study. But it follows, then, that the absence of any evidence
indicative of a superlative construal of bare most cannot be taken to mean that bare
most has only a proportional meaning.
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